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
SP - 6/74
22 January 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Interagency Meeting on Proposed National Intelligence
Production on Strategic Programs

1. Reference: Memorandum for the Record, subject as above, dated 16 January 1974 covering meeting of 11 January.

2. At the request of the NIO a second meeting was held on 18 January 1974 to discuss the proposed national intelligence program covering the next six months. The following were in attendance.



3. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss in more detail the national intelligence production program which was proposed at the 11 January interagency meeting.

last weekend, as an example of "national intelligence." It was prepared at the request of the Verification Panel and was concurred in by the DCI and the Director, DIA. This was an example of the type of national intelligence called for by [redacted] which was responsive to current planning issues.

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5. Mr. Meyers agreed that the study was a good example of interagency agreed national Intelligence, but he believed [] had in mind products which took somewhat longer to prepare. [] believed we should anticipate issues in sufficient time to produce the related intelligence. Mr. Stoertz suggested that the proposed work program was an effort to anticipate needs.

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6. The meeting then addressed each item in the work program. Mr. Stoertz noted that the [] prepared by CIA/OSR, were included in the work program and no change in them was contemplated. Discussion on the other items is summarized below. As examples for this discussion the background and purpose and suggested scope for two of the issuances proposed was distributed, items 2 and 4 (see attachments).

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a. Item 2, "Prospects for Determining the Accuracies of New Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs"

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(3) One representative noted that GMAIC was a "good coordination vehicle" but questioned whether GMAIC was a "good production vehicle." Mr. Stoertz pointed out that the agency responsible for an issuance can use any scheme of tasking and means of production deemed necessary. With this latitude and the acceptability of national intelligence papers of varying format, GMAIC could be considered a "good production vehicle."

(4) It was agreed that the topic was extremely important in US policy and that the proposed paper should be undertaken by GMAIC. The target date for completion was moved forward to June 1974.

b. Item 4, "Capabilities and Intended Employment of the Backfire Force"

(1) Mr. Stoertz explained the importance to SALT TWO negotiations of performance assessments on the Backfire. It was agreed that currently differing engineering assessments of the Backfire could probably be resolved. The DIA representative stated that the SIC Aircraft Working Group would be tasked for contributions to the report.

(2) The purpose of showing Army and Navy as collaborators on the report was questioned. It was pointed out that Navy is involved because the Backfire is expected to be deployed in Naval Aviation. Army is a member of the SIC Aircraft Working Group and is concerned with the question of intended employment of the bomber.

(3) A question was raised as to how much more than the judgments in NIE 11-8-73 could be expected in the next few months concerning the intended employment of the Backfire. After some discussion it was agreed that the judgments in NIE 11-8-73 might not be changed, but the rationale, aircraft performance data and flight profiles for various missions would give a much clearer basis for those judgments.

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(4) All agreed that this production task should be undertaken with the target date moved up to May 1974. The DIA representative reported that within DIA the primary responsibility for the estimate would be DE. (Action Officer- [redacted])

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[redacted]
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Mr. Stoertz reported the reason for including this item but suggested that the representative might want to consider carefully whether there is sufficient information to make this issuance worthwhile. After a brief discussion it was agreed that the topic should be addressed and that the report would be important even if it concluded that such a development was not underway. Within CIA, OSR or OWI will assume primary responsibility for this item.

d. Item 6, "Prospects for Soviet Success in Improving Detection and Localization of Submarines in Open Ocean Areas"

(1) Mr. Stoertz stated that the complexity of the ASW problem required that the subject of detection be confined to manageable proportions. For example, some definition of open ocean is needed. It was agreed that this report would be limited to detection and localization--searching and identifying--and that the entire subject of ASW would not be addressed. The work Navy had already done as explained by the DIA representative, would go a long way toward meeting this requirement.

(2) All agreed that the Soviets future submarine detection capabilities was a vital issue and that the report should be prepared. Within DIA, DT would assume primary responsibility.

e. Item 7, "The Strategic Implications of Soviet Laser Research and Development"

The OSI representative reported that a laser working group, chaired by the DIA member, had already been formed and was planning to issue a report in the near future. He believed that the community was already organized to address this topic. It was agreed that item 7 should be part of the work program. Within CIA, OSI would assume primary responsibility.

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f. Item 8, "Chinese Capabilities and Intentions to Develop
Missile Threats Against the US"


Mr. Stoertz explained the need to address this subject and
it was agreed to include this item in the production program.
Within CIA, OSR would have primary responsibility for its prepara-
tion.

7. Mr. Meyers pointed out the educational value to Department of State
representatives of their participation in preparation of interagency reports.
He suggested that State should be shown as a participant in preparing the
proposed reports. Mr. Stoertz acknowledged the educational value of such
participation but stated that hopefully the end product, the report itself
would serve that purpose. More importantly, he said, if we involve all
agencies in all production we will be right back to the cumbersome mechanism
we were trying to avoid. Comments of the other representatives indicated
that they agreed that participation in interagency reports other than NIEs
and SNIEs should be limited as indicated in the proposed work programs.

8. The representatives all agreed that the tasking called for by the
work program could be done informally; taking memoranda through USIB
command channels would not be needed. It was suggested however, that a
memorandum announcing the entire agreed work program should be sent to the
several agencies involved.

9. The representatives agreed to meet again on 27 January 1974 for a
final discussion of the proposed work program. The representatives requested
that the background, purpose and scope for each issuance be circulated to
them prior to the 27 January meeting.

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Assistant National Intelligence Officer
for Strategic Programs

Attachment:
As stated

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